Abstract-In cognitive radio (CR) networks, the secondary users (SUs) sense the spectrum licensed to the primary users (PUs) to identify and possibly transmit over temporarily unoccupied channels. Cooperative sensing was proposed to improve the sensing accuracy, but in heterogeneous scenarios, SUs do not contribute equally to the cooperative sensing result because they experience different received PU signal quality at their sensors. In this paper, a two-layer cooperative game is developed for distributed sensing and access in multichannel CR ad hoc networks, where the SUs' transmission opportunities are commensurate with their sensing contributions, thus fostering cooperation and eliminating free-riders. Numerical results show that the proposed two-layer game is computationally efficient and outperforms previously investigated collaborative sensing and spectrum access approaches in heterogeneous multichannel CR scenarios in terms of energy efficiency, throughput, SU fairness, and complexity. Moreover, it is demonstrated that this game is robust to changes in the network topology and the number of SUs. Finally, a new physical-layer approach is proposed to distribute the network-level miss-detection constraints fairly among the interfering SUs for guaranteed PU protection and demonstrate the performance advantages of the AND-rule combining of spectrum sensing results for heterogeneous SUs.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OOPERATIVE sensing exploits spatial diversity to improve sensing accuracy in cognitive radio (CR) systems [1] . While most investigations assume a fixed number of fully cooperative secondary users (SUs) with identical sensing capabilities monitoring a single channel, in practice, there are many possible channels for sensing and transmission, and the sensing accuracy varies over the spectrum and among the SUs. In ad-hoc networks, which do not utilize a central controller, and under the hardware constraints, SUs need to Y. Lu is with the MathWorks, Inc., Torrance, CA 90502 USA (e-mail: ylu8@ncsu.edu).
A. Duel-Hallen is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27606 USA (e-mail: sasha@ncsu.edu).
Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TWC. 2018.2810869 choose both the channels to sense and their collaborators for spectrum sensing in a distributed manner. Moreover, since simultaneous SU transmission attempts cause mutual interference and/or collisions, resulting in wasted sensing effort and transmission opportunities, an agreement among the SUs on sharing detected spectrum holes is also desirable. In this paper, we assume the PUs are oblivious to the SUs' presence [2] , and cooperation is feasible only among the SUs. The PU-SU cooperation [3] is out of the scope of this work. Game theory has been utilized recently to model and analyze SU interactions in cooperative sensing [4] - [11] and opportunistic access [11] - [13] , but, to the best of our knowledge, only the game in [11] takes into account transmission (spectrum access) opportunities when making channel sensing and collaboration decisions in a multichannel CR network. However, the game in [11] is not suitable for a heterogeneous environment where the sensing contributions of different SUs can vary significantly although such heterogeneity is typical in wireless networks. For example, suppose several SUs sense the same channel and attempt to transmit over it when it is sensed idle using a distributed medium access control (MAC) scheme. If some of these SUs are located in the proximity of the primary user (PU), they are likely to obtain more accurate sensing results, which lead to better transmission chances than for more distant SUs. In such heterogeneous scenarios, the SUs would benefit if the distributed MAC method was replaced by the following agreement on coordinated medium access: SUs with good sensing accuracy would share their sensing results with other SUs in exchange for a higher payoff (e.g., a higher chance or a larger time share of transmission) when a spectrum opportunity is detected. Motivated by this observation, we develop a twolayer game where coalition formation across the channels is based on such an agreement on payoff allocation. In contrast, the game of [11] forces all SUs sensing the same channel to cooperate altruistically and awards them equally. As a result, selfish SUs might choose to become free-riders [5] by taking advantage of other SUs' accurate sensing results without contributing appropriately. This approach undermines fairness among individual SUs and, thus, might discourage SUs from contributing to cooperative sensing, causing the overall network throughput to decline.
In the proposed two-layer design, the SUs play a hedonic game [14] at the top layer, where each coalition corresponds to a set of SUs sensing a certain channel. In the bottom layer, a bargaining game [15] is played within each top-layer coalition (channel) where a member SU's payoff is calculated according to its contribution to cooperative sensing using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) [16] . The proposed two-layer structure allows us to utilize standard game theory concepts and solutions at each layer and separates the tasks of channel assignment and payoff allocation, thus facilitating efficient data processing in the CR network. These advantages would be infeasible in a single-layer game that performs both channel and payoff assignment as discussed further in this paper and in [17] .
Moreover, to facilitate efficient spectrum sensing, we develop constraints on miss-detection (MD) rates of coalition members and provide novel insights into the performance of fusion rules of sensing results for heterogeneous networks under the constant detection rate (CDR) [18] constraints.
The contributions of this paper are:
• Development and analysis of a two-layer cooperative game that includes: (i) An efficient, stable, and distributed coalition formation algorithm that assigns SUs to channels within the CR spectrum. (ii) A contribution-based payoff allocation scheme to promote individual incentives for cooperation.
• Improved spectrum sensing approaches: (i) A fair distribution method of the integrated network-level primary collision probability constraint among the SUs sharing the same channel.
(ii) Demonstration of performance advantages of the ANDrule combining for heterogeneous sensing environments under the CDR constraints. We have first proposed a two-layer game in [19] and analyzed it in [17] . However, the game formulation in this paper is different and is more suitable for cooperative sensing scenarios as elaborated in Remark 1. Moreover, this paper includes practical validation, complexity analysis, and sensing data fusion rules for heterogeneous environments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Table I summarizes significant notation. In section II, we introduce the system model, the proposed two-layer game, and the cooperative sensing methods under the CDR constraint. The twolayer game is detailed and analyzed in Section III. Simulation results and comparison with [11] are presented in Section IV, and conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND COOPERATIVE SENSING
We consider an interweave [2] slotted 1 CR ad hoc network with M SU pairs seeking spectrum opportunities in a local area. There are N PUs and N channels, where PU i transmits over the channel i, i = 1, . . . , N. All PUs send data to a common receiver (e.g., an access point or a base station), and the PU traffic on each channel follows an i.i.d. Bernoulli process. We assume that the secondary transmitters (STs) are responsible for spectrum sensing, and the terms SU, ST, and SU pair are used interchangeably whenever the context is clear. An SU can sense and access only one channel at each time slot due to the hardware constraints.
The bidirectional interaction and information exchange within the proposed two-layer game framework is illustrated in Fig. 1 : The top-layer game partitions the SUs into N disjoint groups for sensing different channels, based on the expected payoff computed by the bottom layer games. There are N independent bottom-layer bargaining games, and the goal of the game on channel n is to determine the payoff allocation (transmission share) among the SUs sensing this channel. We analyze the proposed two-layer game in Sections III and IV under several simplified and typically employed assumptions, e.g., the SUs are sufficiently close to each other to ensure negligible control overhead and time-invariant additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, and discuss extensions to settings where these assumptions are relaxed.
Next, we present the cooperative sensing scheme at the physical layer for the set of SUs S sensing channel n. This set is determined by the coalition that forms on channel n in the top-layer game. We consider AND-and OR-combining rules with the FA probabilities obtained from [18, eqs. (10) - (17)] assuming AWGN channels:
where m ∈ S, Q(·) is the Q-function [20, eq. (B.20) ], and
In practice, these channels may be subject to fading, and the ergodic sensing accuracy probabilities can be obtained by averaging over the fading distribution [6] , [7] , [21] . The PU transmission is interrupted if the cooperative sensing method fails to detect its presence, and the integrated MD probability on channel n is given by P n MD (S). We impose the following constraints: Network-level constraint (C.1): The integrated MD probability is the same for all channels P n MD (S) = P Ch MD (cf. Table I) . Node-level constraint (C.2): All SUs in set S sensing channel n must satisfy the same MD constraint [5] , [18] , i.e., ∀m ∈ S,
The constraint (C.1) protects the PUs equally on all channels while the constraint (C.2) is motivated by SU fairness since all SUs should take equal responsibility for PU protection. Individual SUs adjust their local detection thresholds to satisfy the imposed individual MD constraints [18] . Our extensive simulation results using (1)- (6) show that the AND-rule is more suitable when cooperative SUs have heterogeneous sensing capabilities (i.e., different PU-to-SU SNRs) while the OR-rule provides better performance in homogeneous scenarios. Intuitively, if there is at least one SU m ∈ S with favorable PU-to-SU SNR λ mn , and thus with small FA probability P n FA,AND (m), the resulting P n FA,AND (S) is very small since P n FA,AND (S) ≤ min m∈S P n FA,AND (m) in (1). In contrast, for the OR-rule, if only one member SU has very poor sensing capacity, the entire set S suffers since Fig. 2 we compare the integrated FA probabilities (1) and (2) for a set S = {1, 2} on channel n when the average PU-to-SU SNR of the two member SUs is fixed toλ. We observe that the OR-rule and the AND-rule achieve their best performance for homogeneous and heterogeneous sensing capacities (given by PU signal strengths at the sensor) of the two SUs, respectively. The general case is explored below [17] .
Proposition 1: Consider a set of SUs S sensing channel n. The FA probability of S for the AND-rule (1) [OR-rule (2)] is a quasiconcave (quasiconvex) function [22, Sec. 3.4] , which achieves its global maximum (global minimum) when λ mn = λ, ∀m ∈ S, subject to an average PU-to-SU SNR constraint
if ∀m ∈ S,
Due to space limitations, we omit the proof for Proposition 1, which shows the desired quasiconcavity and quasiconvexity by establishing the logconcavity of P n FA,AND (S) and 1 − P n FA,OR (S), respectively [17] . Note that the constraints (8) and (9) are mild [17] . For example, they can be easily satisfied if: (i) P Ch MD ≥ 10 −4 and |S| ≤ 13 and (ii) (ν ≥ 56 for λ mn ≥ 0) or (ν ≥ 13 for λ mn ≥ 1) or (ν ≥ 2 for λ mn ≥ 10), i.e., when the MD constraint P Ch MD is not extremely stringent, the coalition size |S| is not too large, and the number of collected samples for spectrum sensing ν is sufficiently large. Note that, in practice, low PU-to-SU SNR (e.g. ≤ 1) requires ν on the order of hundreds to thousands and medium-to-high PU-to-SU SNR (e.g. ≥ 10) requires less than 10 samples for good performance (see [21] , [23] ).
Based on these observations, in the remainder of this paper we will assume that the AND fusion rule is employed in a typical moderately-sized CR network with heterogeneous SUs.
III. TWO-LAYER COOPERATIVE SENSING
AND ACCESS GAME
A. The Bottom-Layer Bargaining Game
An output partition P of the top-layer game determines the set of SUs S that can sense and transmit over each channel n (see Fig. 1 ). An SU m ∈ S is willing to perform cooperative sensing provided that it receives a sufficient payoff a m (S, n) measured as its transmission probability or share of the slot when channel n is sensed idle. The total utility of S is defined as the probability that the SUs in S successfully detect a spectrum opportunity cooperatively, i.e.,
We ignore the overhead of cooperative sensing in (10) and discuss the effect of overhead in Section III-C. Fair payoff allocation rules for traditional single-layer coalitional and bargaining games are extensively studied in the literature assuming (hypothetical) breakdown of the cooperation, e.g., the Shapley value [24] , the Owen value [25] , the core [24] , the nucleolus [24] , the NBS [15] , [16] , [26] , [27] , etc. In this paper, we employ the bargaining game formulation at the bottom layer using NBS due to its computational efficiency [16] . Formally, the payoff negotiation process on channel n among the set of SUs S is formulated as a multiplayer bargaining problem (A(S, n), d(S, n)) [15] , where
is the disagreement point vector, which characterizes the minimum payoffs the players are willing to accept. Given the disagreement point, NBS splits the overall profit of cooperation equally among the players and maximizes the product of the players' profits [15] .
The mth component of the disagreement point d m (S, n) is chosen as the (status quo) threat payoff [26] SU m can obtain with noncooperative sensing, which generally depends not only on that SU's sensing capability, but also on other SUs' reactions when a given SU does not cooperate. In this paper, we employ the fine NBS (f NBS) [26] , which implies all SUs stand alone if bargaining is not successful. Assuming (hypothetically) that the SUs do not agree to cooperate, detection of a spectrum opportunity by several SUs simultaneously would lead to a collision unless a MAC scheme is employed. As in [28] , we consider the following MAC options employed by all SUs in the set S sensing channel n:
The competing SUs do not employ a distributed MAC scheme. Therefore, their transmissions collide, and the resulting data is irretrievably garbled. (ii) 1/X-model: All competing SUs resort to an ideal MAC scheme to obtain equal transmission chances. After gaining the right to access, the winning SU m shares its transmission opportunity with other SUs in set S\{m} by their binding agreement on payoff allocation. We assume negligible control overhead for this random access MAC model. The chosen MAC option affects the players' noncooperation cost, which measures the impact of SU collisions on their transmission opportunities. Due to space limitations, we consider only the 0/X-and 1/X-models, which have a high and a low noncooperation cost, respectively. In practice, fair distributed MAC can be realized through random backoff and control message exchange at the cost of some control overhead and/or missed transmission opportunities.
Next, we consider computation of the threat payoff d m (S, n) under both MAC models. Label all other SUs in S\{m} as
and define a binary-valued random vector of length |S| − 1 (12) where X m i ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable for the event that the SU m i experiences a false alarm (FA), i.e.,
The threat payoff d m (S, n) (successful transmission probability of the mth SU with noncooperative sensing) for the two MAC models can be expressed as: 
where
is the number of competing SUs for cognitive access.
Using the f NBS payoff allocation result in [26] , the payoffs for the SUs in S are computed as follows.
Proposition 2: For the game (A(S, n), d(S, n)) at the bottom layer, with 0/X and 1/X MAC models, f NBS assigns a payoff [26] 
∀m ∈ S, where the threat payoff d m (S, n) is given by (14) or (15), respectively.
Note that as |S| increases, each SU m reduces its MD rate P n MD (m) in (5), leading to increased FA probability P n FA (m) in (1) and decreased total utility and individual payoffs in (10) and (16) . Thus, large values of |S| are penalized, balancing SU competition on all channels. Moreover, since SUs with stronger sensing capabilities have higher threat payoffs d m (S, n), the NBS (16) provides each SU with the allocated payoff commensurate with its sensing contribution, resulting in a fair payoff allocation. Finally, in the bottom-layer game, bargaining is always successful, i.e., a m (S, n) ≥ d m (S, n) for all m and both MAC models [17] . Once the negotiation is settled, all SUs in S sign an agreement on the sharing of sensing results as well as the payoff allocation vector a(S, n). Also specified in this agreement are the transmission coordination protocol and the mth SU's fair share of a sensed available slot, given by a m (S, n)/ i∈S a i (S, n), ∀m ∈ S. To illustrate, consider the following example. Suppose the overall value of a set of two SUs S = {1, 2} on channel n is U n (S) = 0.8 (10), and both SUs agree on a payoff allocation of a 1 (S, n) = 0.2 and a 2 (S, n) = 0.6. If the channel is sensed idle, the transmission opportunity is shared between the two SUs according to their payoff allocation agreement, e.g., in a probabilistic manner, with the conditional probabilities that SU 1 and SU 2 are allowed to transmit for the entire time slot given by a
, respectively. Other schedule-based multi-access methods for sharing the transmission opportunity can be employed. For example, SU 1 and SU 2 can transmit in a time-division multiple access (TDMA) manner, for 1/4 and 3/4 of the time, respectively. Note that SU transmissions might be unsuccessful due to MD of PU traffic.
We assume the SUs are selfish, but honest. In practice, an SU may falsify its sensing result or otherwise breach an earlier agreement, which can be detected by, e.g., a reputationbased approach [29] . The bottom-layer payoff allocation algorithm is summarized in Fig. 3 .
Remark 1: In [17] and [19] , we formulated the bottom layer game as a coalitional game. We found that under 0/X MAC, this game was in characteristic form [24] . Moreover, it is easy to show that this game is convex and, thus, has a nonempty core [24] , but the proposed NBS allocation (16) does not necessarily lie in the core. Under the 1/X MAC with negligible overhead, the coalitional game in [17] and [19] is in partition form, and the grand coalition of that game is efficient [17] . Moreover, due to the nonpositive externalities of the game, SUs benefit from forming larger coalitions to protect their current payoffs. In summary, our results in [17] and [19] show that joining the grand coalition is attractive for SUs under both MAC scenarios, thus enticing all SUs sensing the same channel to cooperate. However, the NBS payoff might not stabilize the grand coalition. Motivated by these results and assuming the enforceability of agreements [15] , in this paper, we formulate the bargaining game at the bottom layer where each SU is willing to cooperate provided it receives a sufficient payoff [27] . This formulation favors fairness and low-complexity implementation (using NBS [16] , [26] ) over stability guarantees [27] . Possible extension of the game in this paper to the scenario with large overhead cost is discussed in Section III-C.
B. The Top-Layer Hedonic Game
The proposed top-layer game is a hedonic game, which is characterized by a set of players and a preference relation [14] . The set of players consists of all SUs M = {1, 2, . . . , M} over the set of all channels N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, where each SU is associated with some coalition C n = (S, n). Note that a top-layer coalition is a two-tuple specifying both the set of SUs S and the channel index n because the same set of SUs S can achieve different throughputs on different channels. The SUs in S = C n (1) sense and transmit over the nth channel, i.e., the sensing decision of each SU m ∈ S is
The nontransferable utility (NTU) function [24] of the SU m ∈ S maps the top-layer coalition C n = (S, n) to a real value
where a m (C n ) is the payoff of the mth SU provided by the bottom-layer game (16) , given by its probability of transmission or its share of the slot, which depends on that SU's contribution to cooperative sensing (e.g., its proximity to the PU on channel n). The factor R mn is the data rate of SU m on channel n given by R mn = B n log 2 (1 + γ mn ). Thus, the utility (18) measures the effective data rate of the mth SU over channel n, i.e., its data rate weighted by the measure of how likely (or for which fraction of the slot, etc.) it is going to transmit when channel n is sensed idle. Note that both the payoff and the data rate in (18) typically vary greatly across different SU pairs due to their spatial separation. Therefore, the value assignment (18) helps to distribute the SUs over the N channels and assign each SU to the channel where it is most likely to contribute to accurate detection of the PU activity as well as to maximize its own throughput.
Moreover, following the hedonic game formulation [14] , we define a preference relation that guides an SU when choosing a top-layer coalition. An SU m prefers to move from channel n toñ if the preference relation in (19) , shown at the top of the next page, is satisfied, whereC n = (C n (1)\{m}, n) andCñ are the top-layer coalitions that form on channels n andñ, respectively, if SU m makes the move, and C n and Cñ = (Cñ(1)\{m},ñ) are the existing top-layer coalitions on these channels. Thus, the top-layer coalitionCñ is preferable to C n for SU m if (i) its effective data rate (18) improves and (ii) the combined (or equivalently, the average) payoffs of all SUs on channels n andñ improve. The social utility improvement requirement (ii) introduces a loose constraint on selfish and short-sighted individual movements, with the aim to facilitate fast convergence of the partition formation process. In this sense, it is similar to, yet more effective than, the use of "history sets" in [11] as will be demonstrated in Section IV. For example, in Fig. 5 , SU m = 4 prefers to switch from channel 1 to channel 2 if this movement improves not only its individual throughput, but also the combined transmission opportunities (or equivalently, the average payoff) of all SUs currently residing on these channels, i.e., SUs 1-4 and 6.
Given (M, N , a M , γ M×N ), the objective of the top-layer game is to form a Nash-stable [14] partition P (see Fig. 1 and Table I ), where each player cannot unilaterally improve its utility x m (C n ) given Nash utilities of other players. In the top-layer game, SUs use (19) to determine if switching to another channel is advantageous. The proposed algorithm in Fig. 4 employs a distributed switching scheduling scheme to facilitate fast convergence to an SU network partition, where M Active is the set of active SUs and N Candidate is the set of candidate channels for switching. At most one switch is allowed in each time slot. Initially, all SUs actively compete for the right to switch using an out-of-band control channel [30] , i.e., M Active = M. In every time slot, the winning SU m randomly chooses a potential new channel in N Candidate and notifies other SUs in M Active \{m} about its action by broadcasting (on the control channel) (i) a SWITCH signal if (19) holds, (ii) a HOLD signal if (19) fails and it still plans to continue searching, or (iii) a SLEEP signal when all switching opportunities have been exhausted unsuccessfully, i.e., the current channel is the most preferable for this SU. Competition for the right to switch continues until all SUs are asleep, indicating convergence of the partition formation process. Note that all SUs (including sleeping SUs) should cognitively monitor the environment changes, e.g., variation of the PU-to-SU SNRs, the PU/SU locations, the number of SUs, the number of channels, etc., and repeat the partition formation algorithm in Fig. 4 when changes occur (see Section IV). Assuming that these parameters are fixed, the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 3: The proposed coalition formation algorithm (Fig. 4) converges to a Nash-stable partition [14] in at most N M switches. Proof: When SU m switches from channel n toñ, only the utilities on these two channels are affected. From Table I , we obtain (20) , shown at the top of the next page, where
. . ,C N } are the top-layer partitions prior to and after the move, respectively, withC i = C i for all i = n,ñ. The third equation and the last inequality of (20) follow from (16) and (19), respectively. Since the total partition value U (P) strictly increases as the partition formation process evolves, SUs cannot visit the same top-layer partition in Π(M, N ) twice. Moreover, U (P) can take on only a finite number |Π(M, N )| = N M of values. Thus, the SUs must converge to a top-layer partition P * in no more than N M transitions. Note that the bottom-layer game is embedded in the algorithm in Fig. 4 (see line 11) . Thus, the proposed two-layer game achieves a stable structure.
C. Computational Complexity and Overhead of the Two-Layer Game
The computational complexity of the proposed game is dominated by the FA rate computations (line 1 in Fig 3) . For SU m on channel n [cf. (1) and (3)], this rate is determined by λ mn and SU population size |C n t (1)|, where t is the time slot index. Each SU m on channel n maintains three values of its FA rate, corresponding to the current and potential SU populations sizes |C n t (1)| ± i, i = 0, 1, and this FA rate information is exchanged over the control channel as needed. Thus, the initialization step requires 3M FA rate computations. When an SU explores whether to switch to channelñ in time slot t using (19) , it needs to compute its potential FA rate on that channel, corresponding to the updated SU population size |Cñ t (1)| + 1 and its PU-to-SU SNR λ mñ , resulting in one FA computation per time slot. It then requests the FA rate information from SUs residing on that channel. In those slots where an SU m actually switches to channelñ, new coalitions C n t andCñ t form [cf. (19) ], and SU m needs to compute two additional FA rates corresponding to the SU population sizes |Cñ t (1)| ± 1 while all other SUs inC n t (1) andCñ t (1) have to compute only one additional FA rate each, corresponding to SU population sizes decreased and increased by 2 on their respective channels n andñ. Since each FA rate computation takes O(1) time, the total computational complexity of the algorithm until convergence is
where O(·) is the big O notation [31] , T Switch is the set of time slots in which an SU switches in the interval [1, T Converge ], and T Converge denotes the convergence time, i.e., the number of slots needed to execute the while loop from line 4 to 21 in Fig. 4 .
From the above discussion, the communication overhead of the proposed two-layer game mainly results from the action signaling (SWITCH/HOLD/SLEEP) in Fig. 4 , the FA rate information exchange discussed above, and sharing of sensing results. The latter two types of overhead are commonly assumed in the cooperative sensing literature, e.g. [5] - [11] , while the former costs no more than two bits per slot. Moreover, we emphasize that the exchange of local data rate information {R mn : m ∈ S} is not required. We note that the two-layer game structure limits the computational complexity, the negotiation delay, and the communication overhead, since an SU that explores switching from channel n toñ needs to learn only the FA rates of the SUs currently residing on channelñ. In contrast, in a onelayer game where SUs can form arbitrary coalitions spanning multiple channels, an SU looking for a switching opportunity would have to negotiate with and obtain data on a much larger set of SUs.
Finally, while we have ignored the overhead of cooperative sensing and MAC when computing the cooperative utility (10) and the disagreement point d(S, n) (14, 15) , such overhead is inevitable in practice, especially for wide-area networks. Moreover, delay, risk, and uncertainty may affect the bargaining outcome of the bottom-layer game [15] . If bargaining is not successful, it might be desirable to investigate coalition formation within a channel. However, fair payoff allocation has not received significant attention in coalition-formation games since most bargaining games in the literature focus on allocating the value of the grand coalition. Development of novel game-theoretic solutions is required to accommodate such extensions.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We assume the following simulation setup throughout this section unless otherwise noted. The sensing and slot durations are 5 ms and 100 ms, respectively. The SU sensing power P S , SU transmission power P SU , PU transmission power P PU , and noise power P N are 10 mW, 10 mW, 100 mW and 0.1 mW, respectively. All users are randomly placed in a square region of 100 m×100 m, and only path loss effects are considered with the pass loss exponent equal to 2 [11] . The PU-to-SU SNR is given by λ
mn /P N , where d mn is the distance between PU n and SU m. Similarly, the SUto-SU receive SNR of the mth SU pair is given by
m /P N , where d m is the SU distance. The SU energy efficiency is given by the amount of effective data transmitted divided by the expected energy consumed [11] . We compare only with [11] because, to the best of our knowledge, other related references did not consider joint spectrum sensing and access in a multichannel CR network.
In Fig. 6 , we compare the proposed game (i,iii) with the game in [11] (ii,iv) for the two MAC models [cf. (14, 15) ], where an SU is dissatisfied if it experiences a loss in throughput/energy efficiency after playing the game relative to acting as a singleton [see (16) exclusively. The channel availability probability is β n = 0.2. For fair comparison, the AND-rule combining scheme under the constraints described in Section II is used for both the proposed two-layer game and the game in [11] assuming ν = 5 and P Ch MD = 0.01. Note that [11] aims to maximize the energy efficiency while the objective of the proposed game is to maximize the effective data rate (18) . Nevertheless, the proposed game outperforms [11] in terms of the average energy efficiency and throughput in Fig. 6(a,d) . In [11] , a few channels are sensed by many SUs, resulting in SU congestion and high energy cost of spectrum sensing per SU transmission. On the other hand, in the two-layer game, the sensing choices are diversified and, thus, the energy spent on spectrum sensing is more likely to lead to successful transmissions.
Moreover, each SU is allocated the access opportunities it deserves and, thus, is provided with sufficient incentives to participate in the proposed game. In particular, as shown in Fig. 6(b,c) , every SU has higher data rate when playing the proposed game than operating alone (i.e., all SUs are satisfied with their data rates). Despite the fact that the proposed game can have a greater number of dissatisfied SUs in terms of energy efficiency than the game in [11] under the 1/Xmodel [curves iii vs. iv in Fig. 6(e) ], these SUs experience negligible energy efficiency loss [ Fig. 6(f) ], and the overall energy efficiency is significantly higher for the two-layer game as discussed above [ Fig. 6(d) ].
We also note that the changes in the numbers of PUs/SUs at time slots 2000 and 4000 do not cause significant disruptions to these games. Finally, while the overall system throughputs and energy consumption in Fig. 6(a,d) are very similar under both MAC models, individual SUs report a higher degree of satisfaction under the 0/X-model as shown in Fig. 6(b,c,e,f) since this model has a higher noncooperation cost (Section III-A).
In Fig. 7 we validate the superiority of the AND-rule over the OR-rule for heterogeneous environments (see Section II) by comparing the average FA rates of the coalitions formed in the proposed game for the realistic scenario of Fig. 6 . Not surprisingly, we observe significant sensing accuracy degradation using the OR-rule, which can be explained by diverse PU-to-SU SNRs among the coalition members.
In Fig. 8 As V ar increases, the majority of the STs become distant from all PUs, and only a few STs are close enough to maintain good sensing accuracy. In the hedonic game [11] , the former (distant) STs tend to attach themselves to the latter STs (accurate sensors), thus leading to formation of only a few large coalitions [cf. Fig. 8(b) ] and leaving other channels unexploited [ Fig. 8(c) ]. In contrast, the proposed two-layer game helps to eliminate free-riders and randomize sensing decisions, thus maintaining the coalition size, encouraging channel exploration, and boosting the throughput and energy efficiency in heterogeneous networks as illustrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 8(a) . The remaining simulations in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 are initialized with the spatial network configuration of Fig. 6 . In Fig. 9 , we compare the computational complexity (21) and convergence time in Fig. 9 for varying N values, assuming stable SU/PU population and the 0/X MAC model. Note that when an SU determines whether it should switch to another channel, it needs the knowledge of the updated individual FA rates on the current and new channel for all involved SUs in both the proposed game and the game in [11] . Thus, the complexity analysis in Section III-C applies to both games. We notice a significant reduction in convergence time and computational complexity when the proposed game is played, due primarily to provision for the social utility improvement in the preference relation (19) . Extensive numerical experiments show that the actual number of switches needed for convergence is much smaller than the crude upper bound in Proposition 3. Moreover, we tested the scenarios where the social improvement requirement in Eq. (19) is (i) removed; (ii) used in both the proposed game and in [11] . We found that in both cases the two-layer game is still superior to [11] in terms of the data rate, energy efficiency, and fairness.
Finally, we study the effect of mobility on the performance of the proposed game. We assume that the nodes initially achieve a Nash-stable SU network partition and then move in randomly chosen independent directions at a constant speed V following the random direction model [32] . When a node reaches the simulation region boundary, it moves in a new randomly chosen direction in the next time slot. Fig. 10 illustrates the switch frequency given by the number of channel switches per minute in the network [6] . We observe that doubling of the mobile speed V results in 10 to 40 additional channel switches per minute. However, for moderate speeds, the switch frequency is insensitive to the numbers of channels in the network. Frequent channel switching increases |T Switch | in (21) and, thus, results in much larger computational complexity. Moreover, the overhead grows with the mobile speed since the need for message exchange increases. While the proposed game adjusts well to sudden changes in the network settings (see Fig. 6 ) and node positions [17] , continuous mobility, as in Fig. 10 , prevents convergence and increases complexity and overhead. Thus, alternative methods are required to resolve SU competition and provide high throughput in congested mobile CR networks. For example, in [33] and [34] we have investigated opportunistic sensing strategies that rely on multichannel diversity by adapting the reward of each mobile SU pair to predicted local channel state information prior to sensing.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed two-layer game provides a comprehensive coalitional game-theoretical framework for cooperative sensing and access in multichannel multi-SU CR ad-hoc networks. Each SU is provided with the transmission opportunities it deserves and, thus, with sufficient incentives to participate in the proposed game. Moreover, the contribution-based payoff allocation rule accelerates efficient distributed allocation of the SUs to the channels within the given CR spectrum. We also present a new cooperative sensing approach under MD constraints for guaranteed PU protection in the heterogeneous environment. Finally, we demonstrate that the proposed two-layer game outperforms the approaches in the literature in terms of energy efficiency, throughput, fairness, and is attractive in practical ad-hoc networks due to its relatively low computation load, distributed algorithm implementation, as well as robustness to changes in the number and positions of the SUs.
